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Abstract 
 
The Chinese economy is currently faced with the difficult problems of slowing economic growth 
and huge overcapacity. China is struggling to adapt to a “new normal.” Here, I examine the 
mechanism of why China is faced with these problems and some potential future paths of the 
Chinese economy. China does not have a socialist, socialist market, or market-oriented economy. 
Rather, it has a “state-driven economy” and that has deviated far from the saddle path to the steady 
state. The model of a state-driven economy constructed in this paper indicates that it is highly 
likely that China will proceed along a long-running transition path with low or no growth, but it 
is also very likely that China will excessively build up its military.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification code: O40, O53, P20,  
Keywords: The Chinese economy; Transition; Economic growth; Overcapacity; Pareto 
inefficiency 
                                                                  
*Correspondence: Taiji HARASHIMA, Kanazawa Seiryo University, 10-1 Goshomachi-Ushi, 
Kanazawa-shi, Ishikawa, 920-8620, Japan.  
Email: harashim@seiryo-u.ac.jp or t-harashima@mve.biglobe.ne.jp.  
 1 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Chinese economy now appears to stand at a crossroads and be unsustainable anymore. China 
will not be able to keep its past strategy of pursuing the highest economic growth possible. Many 
researchers will agree with these views. Furthermore, the government of China itself is beginning 
to think this way as it struggles to stabilize its economy under the “new normal.” 
 It is, however, unclear why China no longer can continue its long-standing high-growth 
strategy. Although some fundamental change appears to be happening, the mechanism for why it 
is happening has not been sufficiently presented (see, e.g., Huang and Wang, 2010; Dorrucci et 
al., 2013; Albert et al., 2015; Maliszewski and Zhang, 2015). Articles in newspapers and 
magazines frequently argue that a large-scale economic bubble in China either has or will soon 
burst, but it is unclear from a theoretical standpoint that the current state of the Chinese economy 
can be described as a bubble phenomenon.  
 In this paper, I examine the mechanism of the anomalies in the Chinese economy by 
introducing the concept of a “state-driven economy,” which is different from either socialist, 
socialist market, or market-oriented economies. I show that China now faces an unsurmountable 
barrier to growth because its high economic growth in the past few decades was realized by its 
state-driven economy, but this type of economy is intrinsically unsustainable and is fated to 
eventually collapse.  
 Because China has been a state-driven economy, it has deviated far from the saddle path 
to the steady state. Therefore, a change from the current unsustainable state-driven economy to a 
sustainable economy will not be easy. If households greatly and suddenly increase consumption 
up to a point on the saddle path, a smooth and peaceful transition can be achieved, but Harashima 
(2009, 2013a, and 2016) showed that such a jump in consumption is very unlikely. As a result, 
the transition will require severe restructuring over a long period. I examine several potential 
options for this transition. One potential path could result in an excessively large and dangerous 
military buildup.  
 
2  CHARACTERISTICS  
 
2.1  The current state of the Chinese economy 
The Chinese economy has grown at a high rate, i.e., its GDP has grown at about 10% annually 
since the 1980s.1 However, the pace of growth has recently slowed down. In addition, some 
unusual phenomena have emerged; in particular, the ratio of investment to GDP has reached 
nearly 50%. This rate is extremely high compared with those of other economies. In contrast, the 
ratio of consumption to GDP is extremely low by historic standards (Dollar and Wei, 2007; 
Knight and Ding, 2010; Huang and Wang, 2010; Lee et al., 2012, 2013; Dorrucci et al., 2013; 
Albert et al., 2015; Maliszewski and Zhang, 2015). Another important anomaly is overcapacity. 
Many researchers have concluded and even the Chinese government has admitted that China 
currently has a great deal of overcapacity2 (e.g., European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 
2009, 2016; OECD, 2015). 
 High growth rates in the early stages of development of an economy can be rationalized 
theoretically in most conventional economic growth models. However, the anomalies observed 
recently in China have rarely been observed. The existence of these rare phenomena implies that 
                                                          
1 The World Bank, national accounts data. 
2 See Report on the Work of the Government, delivered at the Fourth Session of the 12th National People's 
Congress of the People's Republic of China on March 5, 2016. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-03/17/c_135198880.htm 
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something significantly different has been occurring in the Chinese economy than was the case 
for many other economies. 
 
2.2  The Chinese economy as a state-driven economy 
2.2.1  Socialist market economy 
China calls its economy a socialist market economy. Although this name is somewhat ambiguous, 
it gives the impression that China has a simple mix of socialist and market-oriented economies, 
but how mixed is the economy actually? Superficially, China may look like a market-oriented 
economy with a small remaining legacy of socialism because there are many markets and 
privately owned enterprises. However, in reality, elements of its market-oriented economy are 
limited even now because state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate many fundamental industries. 
In addition, the state (both nationally and locally) wields a strong influence on various aspects of 
economic activities, financial markets are heavily regulated, most financial institutions are owned 
and governed by the state, and most investments are made by SOEs or enterprises that are at least 
partially under the influence of the state (Li et al., 2008; World Bank, 2013; IMF, 2015). The 
Chinese economy is therefore still largely driven by the state.  
 This could indicate that the Chinese economy is actually a socialist economy, but if it 
is, it is not the idealized socialist economy as theoretically described by Lange (1936, 1937, and 
1938) and Lerner (1944). The idealized socialist economy is driven by the state, but it mimics a 
market-oriented economy. Therefore, consumption in a socialist economy is supposed to proceed 
on the saddle path and reach the steady state that is optimal for households. However, the 
anomalies discussed in Section 2.1 (e.g., the extremely low consumption ratio) indicate that it is 
highly likely that China is not on a path that is optimal for households,  
 Hence, the Chinese economy is neither a socialist nor a market-oriented economy. In 
addition, it is not even a simple mix of these two types of economy because both socialist and 
market-oriented economies commonly proceed on the path that is optimal for households. The 
anomalies shown in Section 2.1 indicate that the Chinese economy is driven not by households’ 
optimization behaviors but rather by something else. The Chinese economy, therefore, seems to 
be fundamentally different from other industrialized economies (see Dorrucci et al., 2013).  
 
2.2.2  State-driven economy 
Here, I call an economy a “state-driven economy” if it is largely under the control of the state and 
managed by the state so as to achieve a target rate of growth that is also set by the state. In this 
sense, the Chinese economy appears to be a state-driven economy. The most important evidence 
supporting this conclusion is that, as noted in Section 2.1, the ratio of investment to GDP has 
gradually increased during the past few decades and is currently about 50%. If consumption 
proceeds on the saddle path that is optimal for households, this ratio would gradually decrease 
and eventually stabilize usually at about 20%. If the economy is state-driven, on the other hand, 
the ratio will theoretically continue to increase to 100%, as will be shown in Section 3. Therefore, 
the observed gradual and continuous increase in the investment ratio strongly suggests that China 
is a state-driven economy. 
 A state-driven economy is driven not by households’ optimization behaviors but by the 
state’s will, which is independent of that of households, particularly in its desire to achieve the 
highest economic growth possible. Similar to a socialist economy, the state largely controls the 
economy, but unlike the (idealized) socialist economy, the state does not care about households’ 
optimality. History has shown that established socialist economies are strongly prone to be 
transformed to state-driven economies because many socialist economies were established in 
undemocratic countries where government policies generally ignored households’ utilities. 
Furthermore, a socialist market economy, as China calls itself, also highly likely degenerates into 
a state-driven economy in an undemocratic country. China is undoubtedly undemocratic, so it is 
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not surprising that its economy is state-driven and that households’ optimization behaviors are 
largely ignored by the state. 
 
3  A MODEL OF A STATE-DRIVEN ECONOMY 
 
3.1  The model  
Suppose that a state sets a constant target growth rate of production ρ (> 0), and it manages various 
policy instruments that it can control (e.g., nominal rates of interest, subsidies, and SOE activities) 
so as to achieve ρ. The production function is  
 
    αttt Akkfy
 1 , 
 
where yt and kt are per capita production and capital in period t, respectively; A is technology; and 
α is a constant (0 < α < 1). For simplicity, A is assumed to be constant; that is, technology neither 
progresses nor regresses, and there is no depreciation of capital. (In section 5, I will explore some 
of the consequences of relaxing this assumption.) The state therefore manages its economy so as 
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By equation (1), per capita production grows exponentially such that  
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 On the other hand, households’ economic activities are largely under control of the state 
through, for example, strict regulations and SOEs that allow the state to squeeze households’ 
incomes from both wages and returns on financial investments. Hence, the state can control 
households’ consumption so as to follow  
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where ct is per capita consumption of households. Thereby, 
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that is, by equation (2), in some future period 
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Equations (2) and (3) indicate that ct initially grows at a similar rate as yt (i.e., ρ) because the value 
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exp in equation (3) as time passes. In some future period, the growth of ct eventually 
stops and turns negative, and ct continues to decrease and eventually reaches zero.  
 In sum, for the state to keep the target growth rate ρ, kt must grow faster than yt, but ct 
has to grow slower than yt. Eventually, the economy will collapse when it reaches the point
0tc .  
 
3.2  Implications of the model for China 
The consumption path of a state-driven economy is depicted by the thin dashed curve on a capital-
consumption plane in Figure 1. The saddle path in a Ramsey-type growth model for a 
representative household is represented by the thin solid curve in Figure 1. In a Ramsey-type 
growth model, the economy is assumed to be decentralized and the representative household 
maximizes its expected utility 
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where θ is the rate of time preference of the representative household. There is no depreciation of 
capital.  
 Because a state-driven economy is not driven by households’ optimization behaviors, 
its consumption path is different from the saddle path. Because the objective of the state is to 
continue a constant (high) growth rate, initial consumption will be set lower than it is on the saddle 
path. An important point is that consumption in the state-driven economy does not approach the 
steady state. As a result, the path of consumption of a state-driven economy will be situated below 
the saddle path, as shown in Figure 1, and particularly far below if the state pursues a very high 
growth rate. In addition, because households’ optimization behaviors are irrelevant, capital will 
continue to accumulate even it exceeds the level of capital that corresponds to   θkf t 
(indicated by the bold vertical line in Figure 1).   
 An important question is whether the Chinese economy is currently situated at the left 
or right side of the bold vertical line on the path of consumption (the thin dashed curve); that is, 
has the accumulated capital in China already exceeded the level that corresponds to   θkf t   
(the bold vertical line). If we could correctly ascertain the rate of time preference of Chinese 
households and the current marginal product of capital, we could determine where China is on 
the curve but, in practice, these factors are quite difficult to determine. Therefore, we must infer 
where China is situated on the curve.  
 As discussed in Section 2, many researchers and even the Chinese government itself 
have concluded that China has a great deal of overcapacity at present. A huge amount of 
overcapacity means that China greatly lacks demand for its products. A lack of demand will be 
clearly perceived in a state-driven economy if the state restrains further investments. The model 
of a state-driven economy indicates that the economy will eventually collapse when 0tc , but 
the state will not allow the economy to collapse. In periods when capital is already hugely 
accumulated, the state may begin to doubt whether it continues the state-driven economy and to 
restrain investments. The current overcapacity in China seems to reflect such a change in the 
state’s behavior, i.e., reluctance to invest further. Therefore, it is highly likely that China’s 
consumption is situated to the right of the bold vertical line in Figure 1 (e.g., at point X). 
 
4  OPTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
4.1  Basic options 
If China does not want its state-driven economy to inevitably collapse, it needs to change to an 
economy that will eventually stabilize at a steady state. There are several options for the transition 
to a steady state.  
 
Option (1): The state lets the economy reach the steady state that is optimal for households.  
Option (2): The state compulsorily makes point W in Figure 1 a steady state. 
Option (3): The state compulsorily makes point V in Figure 1 a steady state (V corresponds to the 
kt where consumption is highest on the path of the state-driven economy). 
 
Option (1) means that the objective of the state has completely changed from maintaining high 
growth rates to stabilizing the economy at the steady state for households. If China is currently at 
point X, this change indicates that investment becomes negative ( 0
dt
dkt ). That is, excessive 
capital is “consumed” or destroyed, and production shrinks until the economy reaches the steady 
state (remember that neither technological progress nor depreciation of capital is assumed in this 
model). In other words, negative growth rates continue for a long period. Nevertheless, if the 
representative household’s consumption jumps from point X to Z in Figure 1, consumption 
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proceeds on the saddle path, and Pareto efficiency is maintained during the transition to the steady 
state.  
 Option (2) means that no new investment is made ( 0
dt
dkt ), but unlike Option (1), 
investment does not become negative. On the other hand, the state forces consumption to suddenly 
increase from point X to W and forces it to stay at point W. As a result, the levels of consumption, 
production and capital remain unchanged at the steady state described by point W. In Figure 1, 
the levels of production, consumption, and capital are larger at point W than at the original steady 
state. Judged only from this aspect, Option (2) may be viewed as preferable to Option (1). 
 Option (3) is basically the same as Option (2) in that the state chooses a steady state that 
is not optimal for households, but it differs in that investment is not stopped at the present level, 
but when capital reaches the level that corresponds to the highest consumption on the path of the 
state-driven economy. In this example, this level corresponds to the production indicated by point 
V in Figure 1. Until point V is reached, investments continue to be made and capital still 
accumulates. After arriving at point V, the state halts investments and the economy remains at 
point V indefinitely. The levels of consumption, production, and capital are larger at point V than 
those at point W. Judged only from this aspect, Option (3) may be preferable to Options (2) and 
(1). 
 
4.2  Option (1) 
Option (1) has several possible subordinate options on how to reach the steady state, including 
the following two basic subordinate options:  
 
Option (1-1): The state stops directly controlling the economy.  
Option (1-2): The state still directly controls the economy or it stops directly controlling the 
economy but still largely intervenes in the economy through fiscal policies. 
 
Option (1-1) means that households and firms are released from the state’s control and are allowed 
to reach their optimal steady state. Option (1-2) means that the state’s goal changes from high 
growth rates to reaching the steady state, but the transition path to the steady state is still largely 
influenced by the state.  
 
4.2.1  Option (1-1) 
If the representative household’s consumption jumps from point X to point Z on the saddle path, 
consumption will decrease along the saddle path and gradually approach the steady state while 
maintaining Pareto efficiency. Note that an increase in the representative household’s 
consumption means the consumption of excess capital indicated by the gap between the saddle 
path and production for each kt, which is initially the gap between point Z and W.3 As a result, 
negative economic growth rates continue for a long period, but unemployment rates will not 
increase and resources will not be destroyed or left unused. This is the consequence of Option (1-
1), which I call Consequence (1-1-1). (All subsequent consequences follow this numbering 
format.) 
 However, it is highly unlikely that the representative household will jump from point X 
to Z. The mechanism for why it is very unlikely to jump is explained in Harashima (2009, 2013a, 
and 2016) and also in the Appendix. Households are risk averse and intrinsically non-cooperative; 
therefore, they behave strategically in game theoretic situations. Because of these features, when 
                                                          
3 If depreciation of capital is assumed to exist, the “consumption” of excess capital will be achieved by a 
reduction of investments that correspond to depreciated capital and an increase in consumer goods and 
services.  
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households strategically consider whether or not the jump is better for them (i.e., in a game 
theoretic situation), they will generally conclude that they obtain a higher expected utility if they 
do not jump. Hence, households will not actually choose this path and instead will choose a 
different transition path to the steady state (e.g., the bold dashed curve in Figure 1). Because this 
transition path is not on the saddle path, it is not Pareto efficient. Therefore, the excess resources 
indicated by the gap between the saddle path and the Pareto inefficient transition path for each kt 
(initially, the gap between points Z and X) will be left idle or abandoned. Unemployment rates 
will increase sharply and stay at high levels for a long period (Consequence (1-1-2)).  
 
4.2.2  Option (1-2) 
To avoid Consequence (1-1-2), the state could suddenly increase its consumption.4 Suppose for 
simplicity that the government consumption is zero at present. With this jump, the sum of the 
representative household’s and the government’s consumptions reaches point Z and then proceeds 
along the saddle path, as noted previously. Because the state consumes a large amount of the 
excess resources, unemployment rates do not rise and a huge amount of resources need not be left 
idle or destroyed, but negative economic growth will continue for a long period. 
 The question arises, however, how does the state consume such a large quantity of 
excess resources, most of which are capital inputs that have already been produced? In fact, there 
are several possible ways for the state to consume the resources, including the three subordinate 
options described below.   
 Conceptually, government consumption is the collective consumption of households 
through the expenditures of government (e.g., various kinds of administrative services that 
households receive), so a sudden increase in government consumption can be used as a substitute 
for that of households’ consumption.  
 In addition, an increase in government consumption will generally be financed by 
government borrowing if the economy is changed to a market-oriented economy, but if the 
economy is still largely under the control of the state, it can also be financed by explicit and 
implicit taxes on households. An example of an implicit tax would be the state setting nominal 
interest rates artificially low and thereby transferring a part of households’ savings into the state’s 
hands, for example, through state-owned banks. Another example of an implicit tax is to restrain 
the wages of employees in SOEs and transfer the resulting profits to the state.  
 
4.2.2.1  Option (1-2-1) 
The easiest way for a state to consume excess resources is simply to buy them from firms and 
dispose of them (Option (1-2-1)). “Dispose of” in this case includes not only eliminating them 
but also leaving them unused forever and constructing useless infrastructure. It will also mean 
giving laborers busy work such as the classic example of “having workers dig holes and then fill 
them back up.” These activities do not generate any utility for households, but they can be 
interpreted as a kind of “consumption” in the broad sense that the products purchased are 
intentionally made unusable. High unemployment rates can be avoided, but huge amounts of 
resources are systematically and continuously disposed of and negative growth rates continue for 
a long period.  
 However, many people, including high-ranking government officials, may not accept 
simply throwing away huge amounts of resources for no obvious reason.  
 
4.2.2.2  Option (1-2-2) 
Because Option (1-2-1) seems to be too absurd to be actually accepted, the government will search 
for alternative ways to consume the excess resources that cannot be used for investments because 
the economy would otherwise deviate from the saddle path. One of the alternative ways is to 
                                                          
4 Government consumption, as used in this paper, indicates per capita government consumption. 
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export the excess resources to other countries at lower prices than the prevailing international 
prices (Option (1-2-2)). This is not “consumption” in the literal sense, but it can be interpreted as  
a sort of consumption in that exports are an element of demand. The state does not necessarily 
need to directly export the excess resources. Instead, it can indirectly support exports by directly 
subsidizing firms or through various kinds of regulations. High unemployment rates can be 
avoided with this option, but negative growth rates continue for a long period.  
 An important problem with Option (1-2-2) is that other countries may not accept the 
excessive exports. Option (1-2-2) clearly means setting prices that are far lower than the costs of 
production (i.e., dumping) on a large scale. For the option to work, export prices must be 
artificially set much lower than prevailing international prices. Because of this, export firms will 
lose money, but their losses will be compensated by the state using money obtained by borrowing 
or by extracting it from households through explicit or implicit taxes.  
 If the Chinese economy had a very small share of the world economy, such large-scale 
dumping would not have a significant impact on other countries, and the world might ignore or 
at least tolerate the dumping. However, China is currently the world’s second-largest economy. 
Hence, if it engages in large-scale dumping, it will certainly distort international trade and have 
large negative impacts on the other countries. Other large countries would not be likely to stay 
silent on this issue and would likely take countermeasures, for example, by imposing high anti-
dumping customs. Currently, many G7 countries suspect that China is already exporting steel at 
below-market prices (i.e., dumping steel), and they have implicitly warned China to stop doing 
so.5 The scale of overcapacity in China in some important industrial materials (e.g., steel and 
cement) seems to greatly exceed the sum of demand in all other countries (European Union 
Chamber of Commerce in China, 2009, 2016). In essence, China’s overcapacity is so large that it 
will be impossible for them to export it away peacefully.  
 In addition, under a floating exchange rate, dumping and the consequent trade surpluses 
may result in currency appreciation, which would cancel out the effect of imposing lower prices. 
As a result, excess resources still could not be exported to a sufficient extent. Therefore, Option 
(1-2-2) most likely won’t succeed unless the exchange rate is fixed.  
 Another problem with Option (1-2-2) is the huge international imbalances that would 
accumulate as a consequence of the excessive exports. Because there is no excess demand by 
households in China, it will not import excess amounts of consumer goods or services using the 
money obtained by exporting the excessive resources. Huge trade imbalances will be generated. 
Such international imbalances may result in various anomalies, such as asset price hikes and falls 
and so-called “bubbles,” both domestically and internationally. In sum, even though Option (1-2-
2) may be somewhat adoptable in practice, there are many barriers to fully adopting this option 
as a way to suddenly increase government consumption.  
 
4.2.2.3  Option (1-2-3) 
Capital inputs are also able to produce arms and munitions with only small modifications. Hence, 
the necessary increase in government consumption can be easily achieved by a large military 
buildup (Option (1-2-3)). High unemployment rates can be avoided, but negative growth rates 
will continue for a long period as armaments are excessively accumulated (Consequence (1-2-3-
a)).  
 An important problem of Option (1-2-3) is that a unilateral excessive military buildup 
will greatly worsen international relations and increase political and military tensions among 
countries. The probability of a country choosing Option (1-2-3) will be significantly higher in an 
undemocratic country than in a democratic country because the rulers in an undemocratic country 
typically rely on violence or the threat of violence as a basis for their power and will prefer a 
strong military far more than leaders in a democratic country. Furthermore, an excessive and 
                                                          
5 See G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, delivered at G7 Ise-Shima Summit on May 26–27, 2016. 
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unilateral buildup of military power in an undemocratic country is unquestionably dangerous for 
the rest of the world.  
 Another important problem is that the excessive military buildup needed to reach the 
steady state must diminish gradually to zero as the economy approaches the steady state. Initially, 
the necessary increase in military spending is the gap between point X and W, but gaps between 
the saddle path and the Pareto inefficient transition path then diminish gradually to zero. It is 
doubtful, however, that this pattern of military spending will be easily accepted by the military. 
Once military spending has been greatly increased, the military may strongly resist any reductions 
regardless of prevailing economic and social conditions, particularly the state’s objective to reach 
the steady state. If the resistance is strong enough that the government cannot reduce military 
spending sufficiently, the objective of reaching the steady state will not be achieved. This means 
that Option (1-2-3) would not be fully implemented and the nature of the state-driven economy 
would remain largely the same. As a result, the economy will inevitably collapse as predicted by 
the model of the state-driven economy (Consequence (1-2-3-b)).  
 
4.3  Option (2) 
There are two basic subordinate options for Option (2): 
 
Option (2-1): The state forces households to suddenly increase their consumption up to point W 
and then continues to force it to stay at point W indefinitely.  
Option (2-2): The state suddenly increases government consumption to shift consumption (the 
sum of the representative household’s and the government’s consumptions) up to point W and 
then again forces it to stay at point W indefinitely.  
 
Option (2-1) achieves the increased consumption (up to W) by shifting household consumption, 
whereas Option (2-2) shifts government consumption. Option (2-1) cannot be adopted if the 
economy changes to a market-oriented economy because households’ optimality is achieved not 
at point W, and the state cannot force households to consume against their will. Option (2-2) can 
be implemented in either a market-oriented economy or an economy that is largely under the 
control of the state.  
 
4.3.1  Option (2-1) 
Option (2-1) is highly unlikely to be adopted because point W is not optimal for households. To 
make households maintain consumption at point W, the state must first allow households to 
consume freely up to point W but then prohibit them from consuming beyond point W. However, 
as argued for Option (1-1), if households are allowed to consume freely, they will choose a Pareto 
inefficient transition path (the bold dashed curve in Figure 1). The state therefore needs to force 
households to suddenly increase their consumption to point W against their wills. However, it is 
likely that such enforcement will eventually fail because of households’ explicit and implicit 
resistance and hesitation. Furthermore, even if such forced consumption could be successfully 
implemented, the state quite likely would think that this type of forced consumption is absurd and 
it would be better to use Option (2-2).  
 
4.3.2  Option (2-2) 
Depending on how government consumption is suddenly increased, Option (2-2) has three 
subordinate options. Similar to the situation in Option (1-2), an increase in government 
consumption will be financed by government borrowing or explicit and implicit taxes on 
households in any of the three subordinate options. In addition, new investments cannot be 
substituted for increases in government consumption because the economy will otherwise deviate 
from point W. 
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4.3.2.1  Option (2-2-1)  
The easiest way to suddenly increase government consumption is to simply dispose of the excess 
resources (Option (2-2-1)). The economy stays at point W and high unemployment rates can be 
avoided, and unlike Option (1-2-1), the rate of growth is zero, not negative. The problems 
associated with Option (2-2-1) are the same as those noted for Option (1-2-1).  
 
4.3.2.2  Option (2-2-2) 
A second option is to export the excess resources (Option (2-2-2)). High unemployment rates are 
avoided, and the rate of growth is zero, not negative. The problems associated with Option (2-2-
2) are the same as those noted for Option (1-2-2). Hence, similar to Option (1-2-2), it will be 
difficult to fully adopt Option (2-2-2). 
 
4.3.2.3  Option (2-2-3) 
In the third option, the necessary increase in government consumption is achieved by a military 
buildup (Option (2-2-3)). High unemployment rates can be avoided, and the rate of growth is zero 
for a long period while armaments are excessively built up. Similar to Option (1-2-3), the 
probability of choosing Option (1-2-3) will be significantly higher in an undemocratic country 
than in a democratic country. 
 The problems associated with Option (2-2-3) are basically same as those noted for 
Option (1-2-3). A difference between the two options is that, unlike the case for Option (1-2-3), 
the excessive military spending need not be diminished as time passes. It can remain indefinitely 
at point W.  
 
4.4  Option (3) 
Option (3) has two basic subordinate options. 
 
Option (3-1): When production reaches point V, the state forces households to suddenly increase 
their consumption up to point V and continues to force consumption to remain there indefinitely.  
Option (3-2): When production reaches point V, the state suddenly increases government 
consumption to increase overall consumption (the sum of the representative household’s and the 
government’s consumptions) to point V and continues to force it to remain there indefinitely. 
 
4.4.1  Option (3-1) 
For the same reasons noted for Option (2-1), Option (3-1) will not be generally adopted.  
 
4.4.2  Option (3-2) 
After reaching point V, the characteristics of Option (3-2) are basically same as those of Option 
(2-2), and depending on how government consumption increases when production reaches point 
V, Option (3-2) also has three subordinate options.  
 
4.4.2.1  Option (3-2-1) 
In the first option, increases in government consumption are achieved simply by disposing of the 
excess resources and then the economy remains at point V (Option (3-2-1)). High unemployment 
rates can be avoided. Before reaching point V, the rate of growth is positive, but after that, it is 
zero. The problems associated with Option (3-2-1) are the same as those noted for Options (1-2-
1) and (2-2-1).  
 
4.4.2.2  Option (3-2-2) 
In the second option, increases in government consumption are achieved by exporting the excess 
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resources (Option (3-2-2)). High unemployment rates are avoided, and before reaching point V, 
the rate of growth is positive, and afterwards it is zero. Problems associated with Option (3-2-2) 
are the same as those noted for Options (1-2-1) and (2-2-1). Hence, it will also be difficult to fully 
adopt Option (3-2-2). 
 
4.4.2.3  Option (3-2-3) 
In the third option, increases in government consumption are achieved by a military buildup 
(Option (3-2-3)). High unemployment rates can be avoided, and before reaching point V, the rate 
of growth is positive, but after that, the rate of growth is zero for a long period as armaments are 
excessively accumulated (Consequence (3-2-3-a)). Similar to Options (1-2-3) and (2-2-3), the 
probability of Option (1-2-3) being chosen will be significantly higher in an undemocratic country 
than in a democratic country. The problems associated with Option (3-2-3) are basically the same 
as those with Options (1-2-3) and (2-2-3).  
 However, if a country is undemocratic, it seems doubtful that the military will be 
satisfied with the level of military buildup at point V, and much less at point W. The essential 
nature of Options (2) and (3) is that the state decides to stay at a particular point forever, but such 
a point need not necessarily be limited to points W and V. Point W will be chosen if the increase 
is implemented at the present time, and point V will be chosen if the highest consumption level 
on the path of a state-driven economy is regarded to be the most important factor. But other 
reasons could be used for choosing a point for a steady state. Because the military in an 
undemocratic country does not care about households’ optimality, it may insist that investments 
be continued and that even more capital be accumulated past the levels corresponding with point 
V for the sake of a higher level of production. At the same time, the military may also insist that 
armaments continuously be built up even if the level of investments needs to be reduced to some 
extent and thereby the pace of capital accumulation will slow down (Option (3-2-3-b)). 
 If Option (3-2-3-b) is chosen, household consumption will be squeezed from the level 
at point V to a lower level by a similar mechanism as that shown in the model of a state-driven 
economy, possibly to a very low level. Nevertheless, it is also likely that the military knows not 
to squeeze household consumption too much, or households may rebel against the government 
and the military. Hence, it is likely the military will agree to stop additional investments and 
military buildup before the rebellion of households can no longer be sufficiently constrained. In 
this case, armaments are increased to a certain limit, and the consumption of households is 
squeezed to a limit, but the economy can remain at a steady state indefinitely, although the country 
becomes grotesquely militaristic (Consequence (3-2-3-b)).  
 Option (3-2-3-b) will be likely chosen if the country is seriously undemocratic because 
households’ optimality will be generally ignored. Note that Consequence (3-2-3-b) is only 
sustainable if the assumption that a household rebellion can be constrained is satisfied, but this 
assumption may not always be satisfied if some exogenous disturbances unexpectedly occur.  
 
4.5  Comparison and evaluation 
None of the options can be recommended without hesitation or negative consequences. Option 
(1-1) will generally result in Consequence (1-1-2), and Options (2-1) and (3-1) will not generally 
be adopted. Options (1-2-1), (2-2-1), and (3-2-1) seem to be absurd because large quantities of 
resources are continuously disposed of. Options (1-2-2), (2-2-2), and (3-2-2) will face strong 
opposition and resistance by foreign countries. Options (1-2-3) and (3-2-3) will likely result in 
Consequences (1-2-3-b) and (3-2-3-b), respectively.  
 Options (1-1), (1-2-1), and (1-2-3) have the common feature of negative growth rates 
for a long period, and Options (2-2-1), (2-2-3), (3-2-1), and (3-2-3) have the common feature of 
zero growth rates for a long period. Nevertheless, China could take advantage of world 
technological progress (the model assumes no technological progress), so negative or zero rates 
may not be actually be observed. That said, the Chinese economy is going to have to experience 
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negative, zero, or low positive growth rates for a long period whichever option it chooses. 
 
Options Feasibility 
Unemployment 
rates  
Excessive 
military buildup 
Option (1) 
Option (1-1)   Feasible High  No 
Option (1-2) 
Option (1-2-1) Feasible Low No 
Option (1-2-2) 
Basically 
unfeasible 
Low No 
Option (1-2-3) Feasible High / Low Yes 
Option (2) 
Option (2-1)   Unfeasible Low No 
Option (2-2) 
Option (2-2-1) Feasible Low No 
Option (2-2-2) 
Basically 
unfeasible 
Low No 
Option (2-2-3) Feasible Low Yes 
Option (3) 
Option (3-1)   Unfeasible Low No 
Option (3-2) 
Option (3-2-1) Feasible Low No 
Option (3-2-2) 
Basically 
unfeasible 
Low No 
Option (3-2-3) Feasible Low Yes 
Option (3-2-3-b) Feasible Low Yes 
 
 There are important differences among the feasible options on whether high 
unemployment rates can be avoided and whether an excessive military buildup is necessary. 
Option (1-1) will result in high unemployment rates, but Options (1-2-1), (2-2-1), (2-2-3), (3-2-
1), (3-2-3), and (3-2-3b) will not. Option (1-2-3) will result in high unemployment rates if its 
consequence is Consequence (1-2-3-b), but not if Consequence (1-2-3-a). On the other hand, 
Options (1-1), (1-2-1), and (2-2-1) will not lead to an excessive military buildup, but Options (1-
2-3), (2-2-3), (3-2-3), and (3-2-3b) will. 
 The option chosen is, of course, up to the rulers of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Among the feasible options, Options (1-2-1), (2-2-1), and (3-2-1) seem to be relatively better for 
the households of China because both high unemployment rates and an excessive military buildup 
can be avoided. These options, however, have the common drawback that a huge amount of 
resources are disposed of continuously in the name of government consumption, but this 
drawback seems to be relatively more acceptable for Chinese households than high 
unemployment rates or an excessive military buildup. Nevertheless, the rulers of the PRC may 
have different ideas and prefer Option (3-2-3-b)—military buildup—because China is currently 
undemocratic. 
 
5  DÉJÀ VU: THE SOVIET UNION 
 
5.1  The sequence of events and an interpretation 
The path of the Chinese economy gives us a sense of déjà vu because China seems to have 
followed a similar path of another important state-driven economy, that of the Soviet Union. It is 
highly likely the Soviet Union had a state-driven economy. After World War II, the Soviet Union 
experienced high rates of economic growth for decades, as the model of a state-driven economy 
predicts. The Soviet Union’s economy peaked during the era of Khrushchev and the early era of 
Brezhnev in the 1960s. However, as the model predicts, the problems of overcapacity and low 
economic growth were gradually aggravated in the 1970s. At the same time, the Soviet Union’s 
military buildup continued. This military buildup may indicate that Option (1-2-3), (2-2-3), or (3-
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2-3) was partially adopted because the government realized that its state-driven economy would 
eventually be difficult to sustain. Nevertheless, although some market modification were made, 
the state-driven economy was basically maintained.    
 In the era of Gorbachev in the 1980s, however, the aggravated problems of overcapacity 
and low economic growth could no longer be concealed. In addition, as the model predicts, 
household consumption was increasingly squeezed. In the end, the Soviet Union collapsed in 
1991. After its collapse, Russian president Boris Yeltsin chose a sort of “hard-landing” scenario, 
that is, Option (1-1). As noted in Section 4, however, it resulted in Consequence (1-1-2): negative 
or low rates of economic growth, high unemployment rates, and a large amount of capital 
destruction. Hence, the popularity of Option (1-1) (and President Yeltsin) declined sharply among 
Russian people.  
 In 2000, new Russian president Vladimir Putin changed the economic policies of his 
predecessor. Putin replaced Option (1-1) with Option (1-2), (2-2), or (3-3), at least partially. 
Because of the economy had already experienced 10 years of Option (1-1), Putin’s changes may 
have resulted in a mix of consequences from the several options chosen. 
  
5.2  Differences between China and the Soviet Union 
The situations of China and the Soviet Union are, of course, not completely the same. After an 
initial unsettled period when the Soviet Union was first established, its economy grew at high 
rates in the 1930s, but this high growth rate was interrupted during World War II. After World 
War II, the economy again began to grow rapidly. That is, with the exception of the war period, 
the Soviet Union basically grew at a fast rate from the beginning. On the other hand, the Chinese 
economy did not grow rapidly until the economic reforms led by Deng Xiaoping began to be 
implemented in the 1980s, even though China has been a state-driven economy since the PRC 
was founded in 1949. Unlike the Soviet Union, the PRC did not experience a large-scale war, and 
conditions for fast growth seem to have been met since its founding. The Chinese economy, 
however, did not grow rapidly for several decades.  
 The long stagnation before the economic reforms may have been caused by China’s 
limited accesses to natural resources, technologies, and international markets resulting from its 
international isolation. In contrast, the territory of the Soviet Union consisted of about one-sixth 
of the world’s land area, and there were sufficiently large amounts of raw materials, particularly 
oil and natural gas, to sustain its economy. Technologies in the Soviet Union were also more 
developed. Unlike the Soviet Union, the territory of China is not large enough to self-supply all 
of its raw materials, particularly energy, and it did not have good access to international markets. 
In addition, the level of technology was very low in China until relatively recently. Because of 
these restrictions and its policy of isolationism, economic growth in China was very likely 
severely hindered before the economic reforms of the 1980s.  
 After the economic reforms, the Chinese economy began to grow rapidly. An important 
reason for this high growth was unquestionably the opening up of China to outside markets. China 
joined in the free trade system that was constructed after World War II and has been protected 
internationally, mainly by U.S. diplomatic and military efforts. China was able to access almost 
all resources and technologies from throughout the world. The restrictions on natural resources, 
technologies, and international markets that restricted growth had been lifted. As a result, China’s 
state-driven economy was able to operate without hindrances. Conversely, China’s prosperity at 
present also can only be sustained under the current free trade system that is still protected 
internationally, mainly by the United States.  
 Technology is another important factor. In Sections 3 and 4, I assumed for simplicity 
that technology remains unchanged, but technological progress is important for sustaining steady 
economic growth. Because the Soviet Union was isolated from the western world, it had to 
generate innovations and new technologies by itself. However, Harashima (2011) showed that a 
socialist economy cannot sufficiently generate innovations except for some intrinsically 
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nonmarket goods and services (e.g., military technologies) because such an economy cannot fully 
utilize human intelligence through competition in decentralized markets. This argument can be 
also applied to a state-driven economy because the state largely controls the economy in both 
socialist and state-driven economies. As a result, the level of technology in the Soviet Union 
gradually lagged behind that in the western world, and the growth of the Soviet Union’s economy 
eventually almost stopped. A lack of growth will make an economy vulnerable to various 
exogenous shocks and raise the probability of households’ uprising against the government and 
the military.  
 Unlike the Soviet Union, China can generally access the latest technologies except for 
key military technologies because it is a member of the free trade system. Hence, even if China 
itself cannot sufficiently generate innovations because of its nature as a state-driven economy, it 
can achieve technological progress by buying the latest technologies from the outside world. 
Unlike the Soviet Union, therefore, China may mitigate some of the pain of the transition by using 
new technologies purchased from foreign countries to help its economy grow. As a result, unlike 
the people of the Soviet Union, the Chinese people may not rebel against the government and the 
military, even under Consequence (3-2-3-b). This situation could become very dangerous for the 
rest of the world because the Chinese military could continue to grow excessively for an indefinite 
period.   
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The growth of the Chinese economy has recently slowed down and overcapacity has become a 
serious problem. China will have to change its strategy for economic growth. In this paper, I 
showed that the difficulty that China now faces is an inevitable consequence of a state-driven 
economy, which is intrinsically unsustainable and will inevitably collapse at some point in time.  
 Although things may be perceived as difficult in China now, its future path will be much 
more difficult. Making the change to a sustainable economy will necessitate a long and painful 
transition period. Some options may mitigate the pain, but they also are accompanied some 
negative side effects, for example, an excessive military buildup. China seems to be following the 
path of the former Soviet Union, which also very likely had a state-driven economy. However, 
unlike the Soviet Union, China has been able to and most likely should continue to be able to 
utilize technologies developed in other countries. This advantage may mitigate some of the 
negative impacts of the transition in China, but it may also be worse for the rest of the world if 
China chooses an excessively large military buildup that will continue almost indefinitely.  
 The most frightening potential scenario for the world is that China chooses Option (3-
2-3-b), and the probability of a large-scale war increases. China is not a democratic country and 
thus the probability that Option (3-2-3-b) is chosen is not necessarily low. Hence, the most urgent 
and difficult task facing the rest of the world is to prevent Option (3-2-3-b) from being chosen 
and to encourage China to choose Option (1-2-1), (2-2-1), or (3-2-1). These options are not 
without drawbacks, but they are better than the other options.  
 If Option (3-2-3-b) were to be chosen and the Chinese military were to be excessively 
and continuously built up, China would most likely become isolated from many other nations 
because political and military relations among them would become aggravated. China could even 
be ousted from the free trade system. The leaders of China need to keep in mind that, as noted in 
Section 5.2, China can only prosper and even build up its armaments under the existing 
international free trade system that is currently primarily protected by U.S. diplomatic and 
military efforts.  
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APPENDIX 
 
The Nash Equilibrium of Pareto Inefficiency Path 
 
A1  Model with non-cooperative households 6 
A1.1  The shock 
The model describes the utility maximization of households after an upward time preference 
shock. This shock was chosen because it is one of the few shocks that result in a Nash equilibrium 
of a Pareto inefficient path. Another important reason for selecting an upward time preference 
shock is that it shifts the steady state to lower levels of production and consumption than before 
the shock, which is consistent with the phenomena actually observed in a recession.  
  Although the rate of time preference is a deep parameter, it has not been regarded as a 
source of shocks for economic fluctuations, possibly because the rate of time preference is thought 
to be constant and not to shift suddenly. There is also a practical reason, however. Models with a 
permanently constant rate of time preference exhibit excellent tractability (see Samuelson, 1937). 
However, the rate of time preference has been naturally assumed and actually observed to be 
time-variable. The concept of a time-varying rate of time preference has a long history (e.g., 
Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More recently, Lawrance (1991) and Becker and Mulligan 
(1997) showed that people do not inherit permanently constant rates of time preference by nature 
and that economic and social factors affect the formation of time preference rates. Their 
arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change the rate of time preference 
throughout a person’s life. For example, Parkin (1988) examined business cycles in the United 
States, explicitly considering the time-variability of the time preference rate, and showed that the 
rate of time preference was as volatile as technology and leisure preference.  
 
A1.2  Households 
Households are not intrinsically cooperative. Except in a strict communist economy, households 
do not coordinate themselves to behave as a single entity when consuming goods and services. 
The model in this paper assumes non-cooperative, identical, and infinitely long living households 
and that the number of households is sufficiently large. Each of them equally maximizes the 
expected utility 
 
     dtcuθtE t


0
0 exp  , 
 
subject to 
 
    ttt
t cδkkA,f
dt
dk
  , 
 
where yt, ct, and kt are production, consumption, and capital per capita in period t, respectively; A 
is technology and constant; u is the utility function;  tt kAfy , is the production function; 
  >θ 0 is the rate of time preference; δ is the rate of depreciation; and E0 is the expectations 
operator conditioned on the agents’ period 0 information set. yt, ct, and kt are monotonically 
continuous and differentiable in t, and u and f are monotonically continuous functions of ct and kt, 
respectively. All households initially have an identical amount of financial assets equal to kt, and 
                                                          
6 The model in Section 2 is based on the model by Harashima (2012). See also Harashima (2004, 2013b). 
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all households gain the identical amount of income  tt kAfy ,  in each period. It is assumed 
that 
 
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t
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; thus, households are risk averse. For simplicity, the utility 
function is specified to be the constant relative risk aversion utility function  
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technology (A) and labor supply are assumed to be constant. 
 The effects of an upward shift in time preference are shown in Figure A1. Suppose first 
that the economy is at steady state before the shock. After the upward time preference shock, the 
vertical line 0
dt
dct  moves to the left (from the solid vertical line to the dashed vertical line in 
Fig. 1). To keep Pareto efficiency, consumption needs to jump immediately from the steady state 
before the shock (the prior steady state) to point Z. After the jump, consumption proceeds on the 
Pareto efficient saddle path after the shock (the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path) from point 
Z to the lower steady state after the shock (the posterior steady state). Nevertheless, this 
discontinuous jump to Z may be uncomfortable for risk-averse households that wish to smooth 
consumption and not to experience substantial fluctuations. Households may instead take a 
shortcut and, for example, proceed on a path on which consumption is reduced continuously from 
the prior steady state to the posterior steady state (the bold dashed line in Fig. 1), but this shortcut 
is not Pareto efficient. 
  Choosing a Pareto inefficient consumption path must be consistent with each 
household’s maximization of its expected utility. To examine the possibility of the rational choice 
of a Pareto inefficient path, the expected utilities between the two options need be compared. For 
this comparison, I assume that there are two options for each non-cooperative household with 
regard to consumption just after an upward shift in time preference. The first is a jump option, J, 
in which a household’s consumption jumps to Z and then proceeds on the posterior Pareto efficient 
saddle path to the posterior steady state. The second is a non-jump option, NJ, in which a 
household’s consumption does not jump but instead gradually decreases from the prior steady 
state to the posterior steady state, as shown by the bold dashed line in Figure A1. The household 
that chooses the NJ option reaches the posterior steady state in period  0s . The difference in 
consumption between the two options in each period t is bt (≥ 0). Thus, b0 indicates the difference 
between Z and the prior steady state. bt diminishes continuously and becomes zero in period s. 
The NJ path of consumption (ct) after the shock is monotonically continuous and differentiable in 
t and 0
dt
dct  if st 0 . In addition,  
 
tt ccc ˆ    if st 0  
                             cct        if ts 0  ,  
 
where tcˆ  is consumption when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and c  
is consumption in the posterior steady state. Therefore, 
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0ˆ  ttt ccb    if st 0  
                          0tb             if ts 0  . 
 
  It is also assumed that, when a household chooses a different option from the one the 
other households choose, the difference in the accumulation of financial assets resulting from the 
difference in consumption (bt) before period s between that household and the other households 
is reflected in consumption after period s. That is, the difference in the return on financial assets 
is added to (or subtracted from) the household’s consumption in each period after period s. The 
exact functional form of the addition (or subtraction) is shown in Section A1.4. 
 
A1.3  Firms 
Unutilized products because of bt are eliminated quickly in each period by firms because holding 
them for a long period is a cost to firms. Elimination of unutilized products is accomplished by 
discarding the goods or preemptively suspending production, thereby leaving some capital and 
labor inputs idle. However, in the next period, unutilized products are generated again because 
the economy is not proceeding on the Pareto efficient saddle path. Unutilized products are 
therefore successively generated and eliminated. Faced with these unutilized products, firms 
dispose of the excess capital used to generate the unutilized products. Disposing of the excess 
capital is rational for firms because the excess capital is an unnecessary cost, but this means that 
parts of the firms are liquidated, which takes time and thus disposing of the excess capital will 
also take time. If the economy proceeds on the NJ path (that is, if all households choose the NJ 
option), firms dispose of all of the remaining excess capital that generates bt and adjust their 
capital to the posterior steady-state level in period s, which also corresponds to households 
reaching the posterior steady state. Thus, if the economy proceeds on the NJ path, capital kt is 
 
tt kkk
ˆ    if st 0  
                            kkt        if ts 0  , 
 
where tkˆ  is capital per capita when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and 
k  is capital per capita in the posterior steady state. 
  The real interest rate it is  
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Because the real interest rate equals the rate of time preference at steady state, if the economy 
proceeds on the NJ path, 
 
θiθ t 
~
  if st 0  
                             θit       if ts 0  ,  
 
where θ
~
 is the rate of time preference before the shock and θ  is the rate of time preference 
after the shock. 
ti  is monotonically continuous and differentiable in t if st 0 . 
 
A1.4  Expected utility after the shock 
The expected utility of a household after the shock depends on its choice of the J or NJ path. Let 
Jalone indicate that the household chooses option J, but the other households choose option NJ; 
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NJalone indicate that the household chooses option NJ, but the other households choose option 
J; Jtogether indicate that all households choose option J; and NJtogether indicate that all 
households choose option NJ. Let p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) be the subjective probability of a household that 
the other households choose the J option (e.g., p = 0 indicates that all the other households choose 
option NJ). With p, the expected utility of a household when it chooses option J is  
 
       JaloneEpJtogetherpEJE 000 1  ,               (A1) 
 
and when it chooses option NJ is 
 
     00 pENJE  (NJalone)+    NJtogetherEp 01  ,             (A2) 
 
where  JaloneE0 ,  NJaloneE0 ,  JtogetherE0 , and  NJtogetherE0  are the expected 
utilities of the household when choosing Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, respectively. 
Given the properties of J and NJ shown in Sections A1.2 and A1.3, 
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s
s
ttt dtacuθtdtcuθtpENJE
0
00
ˆexpexp  
         



  

s
s
t dtcuθtdtcuθtEp expexp1
0
0
 ,         (A4) 
 
where 
 
 
s s
r
qr drdqibθa
0
exp  ,                      (A5) 
 
and  
 
 
s s
r
qrtt drdqibia
0
exp  ,                     (A6) 
 
and the shock occurred in period t = 0. Figure A2 shows the paths of Jalone and NJalone. Because 
there is a sufficiently large number of households and the effect of an individual household on the 
whole economy is negligible, in the case of Jalone, the economy almost proceeds on the NJ path. 
Similarly, in the case of NJalone, it almost proceeds on the J path. If the other households choose 
the NJ option (Jalone or NJtogether), consumption after s is constant as c and capital is adjusted 
to k by firms in period s. In addition, at and it are constant after s such that at equals a and is equals 
θ, because the economy is at the posterior steady state. Nevertheless, during the transition period 
before s, the value of it changes from the value of the prior time preference rate to that of the 
posterior rate. If the other households choose option J (NJalone or Jtogether), however, 
consumption after s is
tcˆ and capital is not adjusted to k by firms in period s and remains at tkˆ . 
  As mentioned in Section A1.2, the difference in the returns on financial assets for the 
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household from the returns for each of the other households is added to (or subtracted from) its 
consumption in each period after period s. This is described by at and a in equations (A3) and 
(A4), and equations (A5) and (A6) indicate that the accumulated difference in financial assets 
resulting from bt increases by compound interest between the period r to s. That is, if the 
household takes the NJalone path, it accumulates more financial assets than each of the other J 
households, and instead of immediately consuming these extra accumulated financial assets after 
period s, the household consumes the returns on them in every subsequent period. If the household 
takes the Jalone path, however, its consumption after s is ac  , as shown in equation (A3). a  
is subtracted because the income of each household,  tt kAfy , , including the Jalone 
household, decreases equally by bt. Each of the other NJ households decreases consumption by bt 
at the same time, which compensates for the decrease in income; thus, its financial assets (i.e., 
capital per capita; kt) are kept equal to tkˆ . The Jalone household, however, does not decrease its 
consumption, and its financial assets become smaller than those of each of the other NJ 
households, which results in the subtraction of a  after period s. 
 
A2  Pareto inefficient transition path 7 
A2.1  Rational Pareto inefficient path  
A2.1.1  Rational choice of a Pareto inefficient path 
Before examining the economy with non-cooperative households, I first show that, if households 
are cooperative, only option J is chosen as the path after the shock because it gives a higher 
expected utility than option NJ. Because there is no possibility of Jalone and NJalone if 
households are cooperative, then    JtogetherEJE 00  and    NJtogetherENJE 00  . 
Therefore,  
 
      NJEJE 00   
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s
s
t
s
t
s
tt dtcuθtdtcuθtEdtcuθtdtbcuθtE expexpˆexpexp
0
0
0
0
 
                


s
t
s
ttt dtcucuθtdtcubcuθtE ˆexpexp
0
0
 > 0 
 
because 
ttt bcc   and tcc ˆ . 
  Next, I examine the economy with non-cooperative households. First, the special case 
with a utility function with a sufficiently small γ is examined.  
 
Lemma A1: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .  
Proof:     NJtogetherEJaloneE
γ
00
0
lim 

 
              
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
s
s γ
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γ
dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE
0 0
0
0
0 limexplimexp  
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t dtaθtEdtbθtE
0
00 expexp  
         











s
s s s
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qrt dtθtdrdqibθEdtbθtE expexpexp
0 0
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          



s s s
r
qrt drdqibθsEdtbθtE
0 0
00 expexpexp  
                                                          
7 The idea of a rationally chosen Pareto inefficient path was originally presented by Harashima (2004). 
 21 
          
s s
t
qt dtdqitsθbθsE
0
0 expexpexp  > 0 , 
 
because, if  st 0 , then θit   and    
s
t
q dqitsθ expexp . Hence, because   tsθ exp  

s
t
q dqiexp ,     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  for sufficiently small γ.               ■ 
 
  Second, the opposite special case (i.e., a utility function with a sufficiently large γ) is 
examined.  
 
Lemma A2: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then  JaloneE0  
  00 NJtogetherE . 
Proof: Because 
tb0 , then  
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for any period  st  . On the other hand, because a0 , then for any period  st  , if 
1lim0 
 c
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γ
,  
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Thus,  
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
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 [E0 (Jalone) – E0 (NJtogether)] 
      dtcubcuθt
c
γ
ttt
γ
s
γγ



  limexp
1
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01
 
                         dtcuacuθt
c
γ
γsγγ





  limexp
1
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1
 
                   00   . 
 
Because 0
1
1


γc
γ
 for any   γγ 1 , then if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
< 0 for sufficiently large  γ .                                               ■ 
 
The condition 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
indicates that path NJ from c0 to c deviates sufficiently from the 
posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and reaches the posterior steady state c not taking much time. 
Because steady states are irrelevant to the degree of risk aversion (γ), both c0 and c  are irrelevant 
to γ.  
 By Lemmas A1 and A2, it can be proved that     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  is 
 22 
possible. 
 
Lemma A3: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then there is a    γγ 0  such that if  γγ , 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . 
Proof: If  0γ  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  by Lemma A1, 
and if  γ  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
0  by Lemma A2. Hence, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, there is a certain    γγ 0  such that, if 
 γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .                                ■ 
 
  However,     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE  because both Jtogether and NJalone 
indicate that all the other households choose option J; thus, the values of it and kt are the same as 
those when all households proceed on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path. Faced with these 
it and kt, deviating alone from the Pareto efficient path (NJalone) gives a lower expected utility 
than Jtogether to the NJ household. Both Jalone and NJtogether indicate that all the other 
households choose option NJ and it and kt are not those of the Pareto efficient path. Hence, the 
sign of    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   varies depending on the conditions, as Lemma A3 
indicates.  
  By Lemma A3 and the property     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE , the possibility of 
the choice of a Pareto inefficient transition path, that is,     000  NJEJE , is shown. 
 
Proposition A1: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 and  γγ , then there is a  10   pp  such that if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE , and if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE . 
Proof: By Lemma A3, if  γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  and 
 JtogetherE0    00  NJaloneE . By equations (A1) and (A2),  
 
      NJEJE 00 p     NJaloneEJtogetherE 00  + (1 - p)     NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   . 
 
Thus, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
and  γγ ,     NJEJE
p
00
0
lim 

    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE and 
         0lim 0000
1


NJaloneEJtogetherENJEJE
p
. Hence, by the intermediate value 
theorem, there is  10   pp  such that if *pp  ,     000  NJEJE  and if *pp  , 
    000  NJEJE .                                                             ■ 
 
Proposition A1 indicates that, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,  γγ , and p < p*, then the choice of option 
NJ gives the higher expected utility than that of option J to a household; that is, a household may 
make the rational choice of taking a Pareto inefficient transition path. The lemmas and proposition 
require no friction, so a Pareto inefficient transition path can be chosen even in a frictionless 
economy. This result is very important because it offers counter-evidence against the conjecture 
that households never rationally choose a Pareto inefficient transition path in a frictionless 
economy. 
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A2.1.2  Conditions for a rational Pareto inefficient path 
The proposition requires several conditions. Among them,  γγ  may appear rather strict. 
If γ* is very large, path NJ will rarely be chosen. However, if path NJ is such that consumption is 
reduced sharply after the shock, the NJ option yields a higher expected utility than the J option 
even though γ is very small. For example, for any   γγ 0 , 
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  Consider an example in which path NJ is such that bt is constant and bbt  before s 
(Figure A3); thus,  
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As γ increases, the ratio 
   
   bθscucu
cubcu ss


 decreases; thus, larger values of s can satisfy 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . For example, suppose that c = 10, cs = 10.2, b = 0.3, and θ 
= 0.05. If 1γ , then s* = 1.5 at the minimum, and if 5γ , then s* = 6.8 at the minimum. This 
result implies that, if option NJ is such that consumption is reduced relatively sharply after the 
shock (e.g., bbt  ) and 
*pp  , option NJ will usually be chosen. Choosing option NJ is not a 
special case observed only if γ is very large, but option NJ can normally be chosen when the value 
of γ is within usually observed values. Conditions for generating a rational Pareto inefficient 
transition path therefore are not strict. In a recession, consumption usually declines sharply after 
the shock, which suggests that households have chosen the NJ option. 
 
A3  Nash equilibrium 
A3.1  A Nash equilibrium consisting of NJ strategies  
A household strategically determines whether to choose the J or NJ option, considering other 
households’ choices. All households know that each of them forms expectations about the future 
values of its utility and makes a decision in the same manner. Since all households are identical, 
the best response of each household is identical. Suppose that there are  NΗ   identical 
households in the economy where H is sufficiently large (as assumed in Section A1). Let 
 10  ηη qq  be the probability that a household  Ηη   chooses option J. The average utility 
of the other households almost equals that of all households because H is sufficiently large. Hence, 
the average expected utilities of the other households that choose the J and NJ options are 
E0(Jtogether) and E0(NJtogether), respectively. Hence, the payoff matrix of the Η-dimensional 
symmetric mixed strategy game can be described as shown in Table A1. Each identical household 
determines its behavior on the basis of this payoff matrix.  
 In this mixed strategy game, the strategy profiles  
 
(q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), (
*** ,...,, ppp ), (0,0,…,0)} 
 
are Nash equilibria for the following reason. By Proposition A1, the best response of household 
η is J (i.e., qη = 1) if 
*pp  , indifferent between J and NJ (i.e., any  10,qη  ) if 
*pp  , and NJ 
(i.e., qη = 0) if 
*pp  . Because all households are identical, the best-response correspondence of 
each household is identical such that qη = 1 if 
*pp  , [0,1] if *pp  , and 0 if *pp   for any 
household Ηη . Hence, the mixed strategy profiles (1, 1,…,1), ( *** ,...,, ppp ), and (0,0,…,0) are 
the intersections of the graph of the best-response correspondences of all households. The Pareto 
efficient saddle path solution (1,1,…,1) (i.e., Jtogether) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but 
a Pareto inefficient transition path (0,0,…,0) ( i.e., NJtogether) is also a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. In addition, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium ( *** ,...,, ppp ).  
 
A3.2  Selection of equilibrium 
Determining which Nash equilibrium, either NJtogether (0,0,…,0) or Jtogether (1,1,…,1), is 
dominant requires refinements of the Nash equilibrium, which necessitate additional criteria. Here, 
if households have a risk-averse preference in the sense that they avert the worst scenario when 
its probability is not known, households suppose a very low p and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) 
equilibrium. Because 
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by Lemma A3, Jalone is the worst choice in terms of the amount of payoff, followed by 
NJtogether, and NJalone, and Jtogether is the best. The outcomes of choosing option J are more 
dispersed than those of option NJ. If households have a risk-averse preference in the above-
mentioned sense and avert the worst scenario when they have no information on its probability, a 
household will prefer the less dispersed option (NJ), fearing the worst situation that the household 
alone substantially increases consumption while the other households substantially decrease 
consumption after the shock. This behavior is rational because it is consistent with preferences. 
Because all households are identical and know inequality (A7), all households will equally 
suppose that they all prefer the less dispersed NJ option; therefore, all of them will suppose a very 
low p, particularly 0p , and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) equilibrium, which is the Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Thereby, unlike most multiple equilibria models, the 
problem of indeterminacy does not arise, and “animal spirits” (e.g., pessimism or optimism) are 
unnecessary to explain the selection. 
 
A4  Amplified generation of unutilized resources 
A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path successively generates unutilized products 
because of bt. They are left unused, discarded, or preemptively not produced during the path. 
Unused or discarded goods and services indicate a decline in sales and an increase in inventory 
for firms. Preemptively suspended production results in an increase in unemployment and idle 
capital. As a result, profits decline and some parts of firms need to be liquidated, which is 
unnecessary if the economy proceeds on the J path (i.e., the posterior Pareto efficient path). If the 
liquidation is implemented immediately after the shock, unutilized products because of bt will no 
longer be generated, but such a liquidation would generate a tremendous shock. The process of 
the liquidation, however, will take time because of various frictions, and excess capital that 
generates unutilized products because of bt will remain for a long period. During the period when 
capital is not reduced to the posterior steady-state level, unutilized products are successively 
generated. In a period, unutilized products are generated and eliminated, but in the next period, 
another, new, unutilized products are generated and eliminated. This cycle is repeated in every 
period throughout the transition path, and it implies that demand is lower than supply in every 
period. This phenomenon may be interpreted as a general glut or a persisting disequilibrium by 
some definitions of equilibrium. 
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